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1. Introduct ion 
Post-war advances in computer technology have favoured the intro-
duction and use of computer-based decision and choice models in 
the area of both micro- and macro-economics. This trend has been 
favoured by tx*o circumstances : {1) the enormous progress made in 
designing and implementing operational models based on advanced 
mathematical, statistical and econometrie tools, and (2) the po-
tential offered by modern computer software allowing the researcher 
to deal with complex and large-scale systems. 
This development has exerted a deep-going impact on decision analysis. 
Decision analysis aims at judging a range of feasible options on the 
basis of a set of relevant evaluation criteria so as to eliminate 
less desirable options and to identify the most favourable alterna-
tive(s). In macro-economie decision analysis, however, the researcher 
is usually confronted with intriguing problems such as: a macro-
economie system is usually displaying a multidimensional complexity, 
so that an integrated view is very hard to obtain; the system is 
influenced by multiple (formal and informal) actors with conflicting 
priorities and interests, so that an unambiguous macro-economie 
welfare criterion is lacking; there is a wide variety of diverse re-
gions in a national system each of them interacting with the nation as 
a whole and with the other regions. 
These considerations lead us to the specification of the following 
requirements for an integrated macro-economie model for decision 
analysis: 
The model should - in addition to (socio-)economie components -
also include environmental and energy components so as to allow 
one to study the system at hand from an integrated viewpoint. 
The model should also incorporate the objectives set forth by 
(formal and informal)actors so as to do justice to the existence 
of diverging interests in society (leading to multiple objective 
analysis). 
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The model should also encompass spatial dimensions in order to 
take account of the regional diversity of a complex national 
system. 
These requirements imply a plea for an integrated multi-objective 
multi-regional model. This paper aims at presenting such a model for 
integrated economic-environmental-energy policy analysis in the 
Netherlands. Section 2 will describe some general methodological 
features of such a model. Next, in section 3 a plea will be made 
in favour of interactive decision analysis in order to provide a 
method for conflict resolution. Then in section 4, a conceptual version 
of a so-called Triple Layer Model will be presented, foliowed by a 
specification of an operational model in section 5. 
Further details and empirical results wi.ll.be discussed in sections 
5 and 6, respectively. 
2. Integrated Macro-economie Policy Models 
A complete macro-economie policy model provides a stylized and consis-
tent picture of (a part of) a complex reality. In general, economie, 
environmental and socio-political models may be regarded as images 
of the real world created by model-builders. Models used in policy 
analysis should be able to present the boundaries within which policy 
decisions are to be made, the tradeoffs inherent in choosing alternative 
solutions, the impacts of policy measures on a set of relevant policy 
targets, possibilities for a communication between experts (or planners) 
and decision-makers, and the sensitivity for changes in the spatial 
scale, the time horizon or the level of measurement of variables. 
Such methodological conditions are hardly fulfilled in modeling practice, 
so that the determination and the judgement of the unique optimal state 
of the system is fraught with difficulties. Consequently, many con-
ventional programming approaches have only a limited validity in the 
practice of policy analysis. That is also the reason why - instead of 
optimality analyses - impact analyses, effectiveness analyses, decision 
support analyses and strategie decision analyses have received increasing 
attention in recent years. In such analyses, much emphasis is placed 
on the effects of policy objectives and policy instruments, the role of 
conflict management and the meaning of compromise principles. 
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Another reason explaining why many conventional programming models 
have only a limited relevance in policy analysis is the fact that 
such models are usually based on a set of stringent assumptions, 
such as: the existence of one known decision-maker, complete infor-
mation on all relevant objectives and instruments, perfect insight 
into the impact of policy measures on socio-economie objectives, 
absence of equity problems and of spatial or social spillover effects, 
a stable (often linear) structure of the economy, and so forth. 
It is conceivable that these notions are especially relevant in an 
integrated economie, environmental, 'energy and regional policy 
analysis (see also Issaev et al., 1982). 
Integrated economic-environmental-energy modelling has become in-
creasingly complicated over the last decade. Systems theoretic 
concepts, optimal control models, game-theoretic approaches and 
multidisciplinary analyses have become necessary tools for economic-
environmental- energy analyses. There is a strong tendency towards 
a more coherent and integrated analysis, in which economie, environ-
mental, energy and regional aspects are brought together in one 
consistent framework (see Lakhsmanan and Nijkamp, 1980). This need 
for integrated modelling is mainly caused by the fact that the post-
war economie growth paradigm intertwined with technological, scientific 
and educational progress and rising population numbers, has overlooked 
inter alia the social and ecological dimensions of this process and 
hence has led to a serious threat for the man-made and natural environ-
ment. This development can not only be observed in the developed 
countries, but also in the Third World countries, especially in those 
areas where a rapid industrial expansion is not accompanied by sufficiënt 
monetary resources for environmental protection and pollution abatement. 
Integrated planning and policy models provide essentially some necessary 
means to restore the balance in favour of more emphasis on environ-
mental dimensions (cf. also Guldman and Shefer, 1981). 
As environmental and energy policy analysis usually takes place in a 
complex field with conflicting goals, various social interests, multiple 
decision groups and power structures, this analysis should necessarily 
take account of the multidimensional nature of environmental and energy 
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problems (see Nijkamp, 1980). It is clear, that a broader, socially-
oriented view of policy analysis requires an integrative framework 
for judging alternative policy options. This will, in general, imply 
that - instead of optimization of the systems outcomes - the attention 
has to be focussed on providing a rational basis for the policy 
decisions regarding the system, among others, by revealing conflicts 
among objectives or groups, by assessing trade-offs among different 
choice options, by gauging the distribution aspects of policy measures, 
by identifying efficiënt solutions and by designing appropriate and 
relevant methods and procedures for policy evaluation and for compromise 
strategies. The current interest in interactive multi-objective 
decision models shows clearly such new trends in designing and employing 
modern tools for environmental policy-making (see also Hafkamp and 
Nijkamp, 1982a, and Hafkamp, 1983). 
The foregoing remarks lead us to the specification of the following 
requirements on a relevant integrated policy analysis (see also 
Nijkamp and Spronk, 1982): 
appropriate and reliable assessment of relevant impacts of policy 
measures or exogenous changes 
complete representation of the policy area concerned (including 
its feasible decision space) 
multidimensional representation of the diverse components or modules 
of '' e system at han.' 
flexible adjustment of the policy analysis to new information or 
new circumstances 
comprehensible presentation of the resu". zs to responsible decision-
makers or actors 
appropriate use of available data (including qualitative data) 
consideration of equity aspects and spillover effects 
treatment of trade-offs and conflicts inherent in the choice 
problem at hand 
use of learning strategies and decision aid tools in a communication 
between all participants involved in the policy problem at hand 
integrated approach with much attention paid to compromise procedures 
and institutional dimensions 
emphasis on 'satisficer' principles rather than on 'optimizer' 
principles. 
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In the remaining part of the present paper we will make an attempt at 
developing an integrated approach to regional-economic-environmental-
energy policy analysis by using the so-called Triple-Layer Model (TLM) 
(see Hafkamp and Nijkamp, 1982b). It will be shown that recently 
developed interactive (integrated economic-environmental-energy) policy 
models appe^^ to provide a promising perspective for an integrat.* 
multiple objective policy analysis. Two elements are central in such 
approaches, viz. efficiënt (or Pareto) solutions for conflicting 
objectives and interactive strategies among analysts and policy-makers. 
In this regard, it will also be demonstrated that multi-regional input-
output analysis is a necessary part of a meaningful and consistent 
framework for the abovementioned approach. 
3. Interactive Multiobjective Programming Models 
In this section, a brief intrpduction to interactive multiobjective 
decision analysis will be given, as this approach makes up one of 
the foundation stones of the abovementioned TLM. Interactive decision 
analysis is one of the fruitful results of modern high speed computer 
technology. This approach to decision analysis aims at including in a 
stepwise manner various political (or subjective) considerations in 
formal optimizing models characterized by multiple policy objectives. 
After a specification of conflicting objectives and the identification 
of a feasible (not necessarily the most desirable) compromise solution, 
a set of additional policy desires (for instance, minimum achievement 
levels, reference points, or aspiration levels) may be introduced so as 
to find a new feasible compromise solution that is more satisfactory. 
Interactive approaches have several advantages : a closer involvement of 
actors in the choice proeess, a procedural view of planning, a 'satis-
ficing' instead of an optimizing behaviour, a greater flexibility by 
means of simulation experiments or scenario analyses, and a greater 
potential for practical applications (especially because no policy weights 
have to be specified). The majority of these interactive approaches 
are based on a reference point optimization technique, in which an 
attempt is made at minimizing the discrepancy between a series of points 
on the efficiency frontier and a reference point. It has to be added 
that especially procedural interactive policy analyses may be very 
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helpful tools in policy negotiations on conflicting issues. 
Some essential elements of interactive multiple objective analysis 
will now briefly be described. 
Suppose a general model containing a vector of decision variables ^ 
(instruments, e.g.), of policy target variables w (with elements 
w., i=l,...,l), of other endogenous variables x , and of exogenous 
data v : 
1 <£> w, x. v) = 0 (3.1.) 
Then under certain conditions the following reduced form for the targets 
may be assumed: 
w = _g_ {z_, v) (3.2.) 
In addition to (2), a set of constraints (technical, social, political, 
economie, etc.) on the whole system may be defined: 
z € K (3.3.) 
where K represents a feasible area for the variables at hand. Then 
an efficiënt (non-dominated or Pareto) solution may be defined as 
follows: £ £ K is efficiënt, if no z,* € K does exist, such that: 
w* = _g (£*, v) :> w 
and for some i : f (3.4.) 
w. = g. (z*, v) > w. i £ {l,...,n} 
ï ï — — ï 
Consequently, an efficiënt solution supposesthat no other feasible 
policy exists, which is equally good for all policy criteria and better 
for at least one criterion (cf. Despontin, 1980; Nijkamp, 1978, 1979). 
In general, one may impose the condition that any good policy mix is an 
efficiënt solution, although it is clear that in practice many inferior 
solutions may occur. Nevertheless, a meaningful policy analysis should 
focus the attention in particular on the efficiency frontier (or Pareto 
curve) in order to identify a policy that will not be dominated by other 
policies. This is especially important in the framework of interactive 
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policy models which usually aim at identifying in a stepwise fashion 
a compromise solution located on the efficiency frontier. The 
identification of a 'satisficing' (compromise) solution is however, 
a far frem easy task. 
Fortunately, in the field of mathematical programming and mathematical 
economics, in recent years much work has been undertaken to formulate 
operational optimization procedures for problems with multiple objectives 
(see among others, Keeney and Raiffa, 1976; Cohon, 1979; Rietveld, 1980, 
and Nijkamp and Spronk, 1981). At present, there is a whole spectrum 
of different multiobjective methods available, both in the field of 
continuous programming analysis (see, e.g. Nijkamp, 1979) and in the 
field of discrete plan and project evaluation methods (see, e.g. Voogd, 
1982). 
It should be noted however that many of these procedures have not been 
specifically designed for macro-economie decision-making. The useful-
ness of these diverse methods and procedures for macro-economie policy 
analysis very much depends on the way macro-oriented priorities and 
conflicts can be taken into account. With respect to this issue, it may 
be meaningful to distinguish these methods and procedures according to 
the information available on the decision-maker's preferences (see, e.g. 
Hwang and Masud, 1979). Three cases may then be distinghuished: 
(1) full information, (2) limited information and (3) no information. 
Especially in case of limited or zero information, interactive procedures 
may be very helpful. Many problems in an integrated policy analysis do 
not require an unambiguous solution that represents once and for all 
the optimal state of the system concerned: compromise strategies appear 
to prevail. In the light of the process character of many decision 
problems, an interactive policy analysis may therefore, be a reasonable 
and operational approach. This approach is usually composed of a series 
of steps based on a systematic exchange of information (based on computer 
experiments) between decision-makers and analysts. Such interactive 
approaches are normally characterized by the following pair of steps: 
the analysts propose meaningful and feasible (trial) solutions on 
the basis of a well-defined compromise procedure. 
the decision-makers respond to each (trial) solution by indicating 
in which respect (i.e., in regard to which effects) the proposed 
compromise is still unsatisfactory (given their views on mimimum 
achievement levels, aspiration levels, e t c ) . 
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These pairs of steps are then successively repeated, until after a 
series computer experiments, a final satisfactory compromise solution 
has been identified. As mentioned before, a large number of inter-
active models has recently been developed (see among others, Rietveld, 
1980 and Spronk, 1981). 
Interactive policy analyses based on multiobjective programming methods 
have already demonstrated their meaning in various policy problems, 
also in a macro-economie context. They may be regarded as having many 
significant advantages compared to traditional optimization methods 
(see Nijkamp and Spronk, 1981). 
In the present paper, only one specific type of interactive policy 
method will be dealt with, viz. the method of displaced ideals (see 
Zeleny, 1976 and Nijkamp, 1980). It is a method which needs no explicit 
prior information on trade-offs between targets expressed by decision-
makers in the procedure. If they are offered a feasible (and efficiënt) 
solution to the multi-objective problem, they only need to choose an 
objective which has to be improved in value in the next iteration of the 
procedure. This tentative compromise solution is determined on the 
basis of a reference solution (the 'ideal' point), which is regarded here 
as the points on the main diagonal ,of the pay-off matrix associated with 
the multiple objective problem. Figure 1 provides a concise presenta-
tion of the stages of this interactive optimization procedure. 
1)start 
ifc_ 
2) calculate pay-off 
matrix 
att-
,x generate tentative 
compromise solution 
YES 
compromise 
4)so lu t ion satisfactory*J 
^ 
__ NO 
Dtentative compromise is 
final compromise  
6) adjust constraints set 
5)identify unsatisfactory 
value of obiective(s) 
Figure 1. Steps of an interactive optimization procedure. 
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More details regarding this method can be found in Hafkamp and 
Nijkamp (1982b) and Hafkamp (1983). 
The abovementioned procedure can also be directly related to scenario 
analyses for macro-economie policy-making. A scenario is a consistent 
set of prospective values of plans, goals, instruments and exogenous 
circumstances. Both single and compound may be dealt with. Choices 
among different scenarios may also be generated by means of the above-
mentioned interactive multiobjective methods. 
4. A Conceptual Triple-Layer Model (TLM) 
TLM is a model of a spatial system where economie, environmental and 
socio-political aspects are integrated. The spatial element implies that 
the system is analyzed at the level of regions interacting with the national 
level. Consequently, TLM is a national-regional economie environmental 
model. TLM is a result of projecting a complex reality on three mutually 
interacting parallel layers: 
an economie layer 
an employment layer 
an environmental layer. 
Several aspects of a complex and multidimensional system can thus be de-
picted in various submodels, according to their respective different as-
pects and consequences. 
The design strategy of TLM implies a three stage procedure, where first a 
simple model is constructed, so as to depict the triple layer structure and 
to del*neate the scope and detail of the i^ odel (see also Hafkamp, 1983). 
The second step of the design procedure is the construction of a conceptual 
triple layer model and is described in the present section; the third step 
assembling the operational triple layer model, is dealt with in the next 
section. 
The conceptual model presented here is a multi-regional model of an economy 
where economie, socio-political and environmental aspects of a society 
are of main importance. Public decision-making and planning in such a 
spatial system will be analyzed in a way analogous to allocation mechanisms 
in formalized economies with public goods and external effects (see also 
Ruys, 1975). We shall explicitly deal with (groups of) individuals 
belonging to a certain region of the spatial system and to a certain 
interest group (e.g., environmentalists, labour unions). 
r 
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Conceptually, the model has the following structure. The spatial 
system consists of a set of regions: 
R - { l , 2, .... R( (4.1) 
The individuals within the spatial system are denoted by: 
Ï«<1, 4 (4-2) 
The set of individuals in a region is written as: 
ï r = \lr. 2r, ...Ir} r E R (4.3) 
where I-fll.., > É for r^r' and U L . = T 
r r
 r=i r 
The elements which are of importance for individual decisionmaking are 
regional income, employment and environmental quality. As notation of 
attainable outcomes in the system, we adopt: 
sr • (y rJ r,z r) , reR 1 
s - (slss2 sR) V (4.4) 
s e S ; S is compact and convex. J 
s is an R-tuple of vectors describing the state of the entire spatial 
system. sp is a vector describing the state of the system for region r, 
where 
yr denotes regional income 
lr denotes regional employment 
zr denotes regional environmental quality 
Various policy mixes (combinations of regional economie policy, 
environmental policy, and labor market policy) enable a central authority 
to "control" the spatial system so as to reach, in principle, any 
situation which is reflected by an element of S. 
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Individuals in a region have a "consumption" set which is denoted as: 
X - 4 x | x = (y,1,z) e Rj^ (4.5) 
As mentioned above, we may distinguish different interest groups. 
There are various ways of incorporating such groups in individual welfare 
functions. Here we suppose the existence of twice differentiable, concave 
individual welfare functions: 
wi (x.r) V \ (4*6) 
Thus,the welfare position of an individual in region r is only determined 
by income, employment and environmental quality in region r. 
In addition, a choice set C is defined that serves as the basis for 
individuals to decide which objective is the most urgent one and hence 
should be raised first: 
3 | 
c
= { $ i e R3 I £i = (ai,a2'a3)A aj» X aj e \°> A » J581»2»3 | (4 
(4.7) means that during each state of th( choice process not all 
objectives can be improved simultaneously, but that only one objective can 
be increased in value (in other words, a. is a zero-one variable). The 
J 
spatial system composed of individuals can now concisely be characterised 
by: 
EE={ÏÏ, Tr, S,(Xr, Wi , C)( (4.8) 
Spatial system EE can - from the point of view of individuals - be 
regarded as an economy with external effects only. The set of Pareto-
optimal states PO in this system can now be defined as: 
P0 = -{ s e S |3r
 E ÏÏ, 3i r e ïr:wi (s'r) > wi (sr) » s'e S V 
r r 
{ 3r e R, 3 j r e T r: Wj (s'r) < wjt (s r)| (4.9) 
\ 
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A state of the system is called Pareto-optimal, if an improvement of 
any individual welfare position is only possible (i.e., within S) through 
affecting at least one other individual*s welfare position. It should be 
noted that here an efficiency criterion is defined rather than an 
equilibrium criterion. The set of Pareto-optimal solutions is also known 
as the set of efficiënt or non-dominated solutions. 
The presence of different interest groups that want to maximize 
respectively regional income, employment and environmental quality makes 
it impossible to identify one single overall best solution. Consequently, 
formally a multi-decision-maker, multi-objective problèm has to be solved 
so as to achieve a state of the system that is a compromise for the 
conflicting interests among groups. 
This can be done by using the interactive method based on displaced 
ideals which was described in Section 3. However, this method does not 
specify a decision rule for identifying a 'most urgent' objective if there 
are many decision-makers involved. This lack may be overcome by using a 
voting procedure based on a majority rule. The preference relationships 
should be interpreted as 'tacit preferences' (preferences of which 
decisi on-makers themselves are not explicitly and entirely aware ). 
Clearly, if all individuals would have a set of known welfare 
functions, an interactive compromise procedure would be superfluous in 
selecting an optimal (compromise) state for system EE, since in that case 
a straightforward traditional optimization approach could be used. We 
make the assumption however, that individuals are not explicitly aware of 
welfare functions describing their preferences. We also assume that they 
are unable to give precise information on their preferences in terms of 
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weights (trade-offs) attached to the various objectives (income, employ-
ment and environmental quality). Otherwise, it would be easy for a 
central government to simply optimize a social welfare function of the 
type: 
R h-
w(s) = ^ I A ^ I w1 (s ) (4.10) 
r r r 
or to optimize a weighted sum of the objectives, using information on 
trade-offs given by the individuals. 
The steps of the interactive compromise procedure are already contained 
in Fig. 1. The selection itself of an unsatisfactory value of an 
objective takes place choosing a 'most unsatisfactory' level of an 
objective by means of a democratie voting procedure, so that a central 
authority has to count the votes concerning the most unsatisfactory 
objectives and next adjust the constraint set accordingly. 
A more detailed description of the way a TLM is coupled with an 
interactive multi-objective procedure is contained in Hafkamp and Nijkamp 
(1982a). 
5. An Operational Triple-Layer Model (TLM) 
The operational TLM is composed of three sub-models - one for each 
layer -: an economie, an employment and an environmental sub-model. A 
detailed discussion of all equations, variables and data of these 
sub-models can be found in Hafkamp (1983). In this section we only 
discuss the mainlines of the various sub-models. 
The economie sub-model comprises a national-regional economie model of 
the Dutch economy. It is the result of coupling the so-called 
\ 
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Secmon-model (see Driebuis, 1978)with a multi-regional input-output model 
of five Dutch regions (see Appendix, Fig. A 1). Various goal variables 
are included in this sub-model: inflation, current and capita! accounts, 
and economie growth. Policy Instruments are: taxes and public 
expenditure, monetary instruments, exchange rate, wage and price control 
and labour market policy. Economie actors are: households, firms, 
government and other agents. 
The relationships between the components of the economie sub-model are 
described by means of 10 modules: 
production (based on input-output tables) 
final demand (consumption, investment, public expenditure and 
exports) 
imports (final products, raw materials and manufacturing inputs) 
production capacity 
1abor market 
wages and prices 
i ncome 
government expenditure 
social insurances 
monetary systems 
An extensive description of the economie sub-model can be found in Hafkamp 
(1982). 
The employment sub-model analyzes primarily the demand for labor at 
both a regional and sectoral level. For the time being, the supply-side 
of the labor market is considered as exogenously determined by demographic 
and social developments. It would be worthwhile however, to inciude more 
detailed information on demographic developments, education and training 
endogenously in the model. 
\ 
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The environmental submodel describes 3 aspects of environmental 
quality: 
1. Emission of air pollutants caused by: 
a. combustion of fossil fuels 
b. process emissions, etc. 
2. Concentration of air pollutants (via diffusion) 
3. Reduction of emission by: 
a. saving energy, selective growth, etc. 
b. alternative choices of energy sources 
c. anti-pollution technology. 
Pollution of water and soil is not taken into account here, nor is any 
attention paid to the phenomenon of synergetic effects. The following 
pollution categories are taken into account: sulphur dioxide, nitrogen 
oxides and dust particles. 
The choice of energy source also has an important influence on the 
emission of air pollutants. For example: SOo emissions in the 
Netherlands decreased drastically after a large-scale introduction of 
natural gas, but since a switch back to coal or oil took place, a drastic 
increase occurred. Especially the shift of electricity producers from 
natural gas to oil» coal or nuclear energy and the further expioration and 
introduction of alternative energy sources (solar energy, wind, etc.) are 
of great importance to environmental quality. 
The way in which the components of these 3 modules are linked is 
represented in Fig. 2. 
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Fig. 2. The Triple Layer Model, its sub-models and their 
major relations. Source: Hafkamp (1983). 
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6. Interactive Multiobjective Programming with the Triple Layer Model 
Implementing the operational triple layer model of Section 5 has 
presented us with a number of computational problems. Solving vector 
optimization problems of this size asks for powerful optimization routines. 
In this section, we will apply the interactive compromise procedure 
introduced in Section 3, to the operational version of TLM. While 
applying the interactive compromise procedure to the conceptual version of 
TLM focuses on choice aspects for individuals and on coordination aspects 
as to public decision-making, its application to the operational version 
is primarily concerned with controlling the procedure itself and 
understanding the results obtained. 
The model is comprised of five regions (see Appendix, Fig. A 1), with 
three objectives in each region — income, employment, and environmental 
quality. This means that the compromise procedure produces compromises 
between regional interests as wel! as between objectives at the regional 
level. Therefore, a multitude of versions of the procedure could be 
designed so as to reflect a variety of institutional arrangements under 
which socio-economic decision-making takes place. These institutional 
arrangements may imply that a single authority, viz. central government, 
is the single decision-maker. They may also imply that decision-making is 
entirely left to regional planners, whose decisions, votes, wishes, and 
actions are added up only at the central level. Various intermediate 
arrangements are possible as well, and can be described as multi-level 
decision-making procedures (see in particular, Rietveld, 1981). 
The basic version of the procedure implies separate optimization of 
all 5x3 objectives at every iteration, while a choice can be made in the 
procedure between fast covergence(£=l; this parameter will later be 
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discussed) and slow convergence (0 < 1). Simplified versions of the 
procedure, optimizing separate objectives only at the national level in 
each iteration and adjusting the constraint set for objectives at the 
national or regional level,are described in Hafkamp (1983). 
Since the Triple Layer Model has approximately 500 endogenous 
variables, it would be very inconvenient to present the results of each 
simulation run for all such variables. Throughout this Chapter, we shall 
express the values of objective variables as index numbers. As a base for 
these index numbers, a feasible solution for the model is used which is 
found by setting all instrument variables at a fixed, zero value. The 
solution which results is found in the interior of the solution set (i.e., 
it is not an efficiënt solution). This base solution is given in Table 1. 
In order to demonstrate the interactive compromise procedure we wi11 now 
discuss it step by step — using Figure 1 as a guideline — for several 
consecutive iterations. 
1) Start 
The problem is prepared for multi-objective optimization using a 
computed optimization package. In this; case the APEX optimization 
package (by CDC) was used. 
The selection of unsatisfactory values of objectives is to be 
done by the decisionmakers themselves. For example, they may follow a 
negotiation procedure if they are regional planners. If they are the 
inhabitants of the regional system, they may use a voting procedure, 
or any intermediate between negotiating and voting. One possible 
voting procedure was demonstrated in Chapter 6 when we applied the 
interactive compromise procedure to the conceptual version of the 
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Var Solution 
National 
income ' 
employment ' r» 4 
125572 
3244 
env. qual.3) 1033 
Region 1 
income 
z, 
12653 
employment 298 
env. qual. 13G1 
Region 2 
income f2 
2 
19433 
employment 561 
env. qual. 52  1448 
Region 3 
income 
1
 3 
Zo 
28473 
employment 797 
env. qual. 2228 
Region 4 
income 
' J 31396 employment 748 
env. qual. . z4  1687 
Region 5 
income y 5 33615 
employment 837 
env. qual. Z5 3633 
Table 1. Basic model solution obtained by fixing all policy 
instruments at zero values. 
1) millions of Dutch guilders in prices of 1973 
2) millions of man years in firms 
3) thousands of tons of "composite pollutants" 
- 20 -
Triple Layer Model. Now, while applying the compromise procedure to 
the operational version of TLM, we do not have the opportunity of 
actually having regional planners or voters indicate their choices. 
Therefore, we will assume some possible outcome of a negotiating or 
voting procedure. 
The interactive compromise procedure thus carried out only 
provides a tentative scenario for a simulation experiment in 
multi-objective decision-making. 
We carry out the procedure with a convergence speed parameter i = 
0.50. The significance of this parameter will be discussed at step 6, 
where the constraints set is adjusted. 
Iteration 1 
2) Calculate Pay-Off Matrix 
The pay-off matrix is found by optimising consecutively all 15 
objectives. Every single optimi zation of these objectives leads to one 
column of the pay-off matrix, which is shown in Table 2. 
3) Generate Tentative Compromise Solution 
In order to generate the tentative compromise solution, it is 
necessary to identify in the pay-off matrix the maximum and minimum 
value for each objective. This leads to the first and second column 
of Table 3. The compromise solution is now found by minimizing a 
standardized distance function which measures the distance between 
feasible solutions and the ideal, but unfeasible maximum solution 
which is given in the first column of Table 3. 
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min d = 
127 - y 1 
127 - 95 
127 - y 5 
127 - 94 
116 - \x 
+ 
117 - Z l 
116 -110 117 - 81 
117 - 15 
+ 
120 - Z5 
117 -110 120 - 71 
(6.1) 
Minimization of (6.1) leads to the compromise solution whtch is the 
third column of Table 3. 
Solutions 
maximum minimum compromise 
Region 1 
income Ü 127 95 117 employment env. qual. 116 117 110 81 115 108 
Region 2 . 
income y 2 1 
Z2 
133 99 131 
employment 
env. qual. 
116 
113 
109 
73 
115 
88 
Region 3 
income f3 
1
 3 
"3 
122 91 115 
employment 
env. qual. 
117 
116 
110 
72 
116 
95 
Region 4 
income f4 l 4 
Z4 
127 94 118 
employment 
env. qual. 
115 
114 
109 
77 
115 
96 
Region 5 
income y 5 
z 5 
127 94 122 
employment 
env. qual. 
117 
120 
110 
71 
116 
94 
Table 3. Iteration 1. Compromise solution, ideal, and 
least ideal solutions for regional objectives 
23 
A more illustrative representation of the resuUs eomprised in Table 3, 
is the diagram of Figure 3. This diagram can be more easily 
interpreted by decision-makers. We will use it for the discussion of 
the other compromise solutions. Tables containing the actual outcomes 
are included in the appendix. 
4) Compromise Solution Satisfactory ? 
As discussed in Step 1 of this procedure, we did not have 
actual voting results on compromise solutions reached. Instead we 
assumed possible outcomes of such procedures. At this point we 
assumed that, NO, the compromise solution of the first iteration was 
not satisfactory. 
5) Identify Unsatisfactory Values of Objectives 
We assumed the following regional objectives to be most urgently 
improved: 
Iteration 1 
Region Objective to be Improved 
1 income y\ 
2 environmental quality zg 
3 i ncome y3 
4 income y4 
5 environmental quality Z5 
6) Adjust Constraints Set 
At this point in the first iteration, the constraints set is 
adjusted in such a way that in the next iteration the compromise 
\ 
- 24 -
130-
120-
110-
100-
90-
80-
70-
60J 
I 
m 
m i 
B 
11 
'X'iX-X*' ü 
Fig. 5. Compromise Solution of Iteration 1, 
between minimum and maximum values for 
regional objectives 
=a 
Yl !1Z1 Y2'2Z2 Y 3 ' 3 Z 3 Y4 !4Z4 Y5 *5Z5 
REGION REGION REGION REGION REGION 
1 2 3 4 5 
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values for the objectives selected under the previous step (5) wil! be 
higher than the actual compromise values given in Table 3. The 
general formulation of raising lower bounds of objectives can be 
witten: 
xi,i + 1 , XL,1+ ^(xC,i _ xL,i ) ; ^G(o,l]. (6.2) 
where: 
X[_ ^ : Lower bound on objective x in iteration i 
xc ^ : Comprovise value of objective x in iteration i 
0 ; Parameter denoting convergence speed. 
The convergence speed parameter is to be set at the start of the 
interactive procedure. A high convergence speed (6=1) implies that from 
one iteration to the next large improvements are bound for objectives 
selected at step 5, while a final compromise may be reached in relatively 
few iterations, as relatively strong constraints are added in each 
iterations. For the present application of the procedure the convergence 
parameter was set at .50. Consequently the following lower bounds for 
objectives were added to the constraints set: 
yL,2 
~ 95 + 0.50 (117-95) . 106 1} 
* * 
= 73 + 0.50 (88-73) * 80.5 
h'Z = 91 + 0.50 (115-91) = 103 
y!r2 - 99 + 0.50 (118-99) . 106 
4-z = 71 + 0.50 (94-71) = 82.5 
•f This calculation of lower bounds is illustrative only. 
Rounded off figures were used. 
\ 
Iteration 2 
2) Calculate Pay-off Matrix 
The pay-off matrix is, again, found by optimizing consecutively 
all 15 objectives, ït is included in the appendix as TabIe Al. The 
differences between this pay-off matrix and the previous one are 
entirely due to the fact that the lower bounds derived in step 6 of 
the previous iteration were. added to the constraints set. 
3) Generate Tentative Compromise Solution 
The second compromise solution is found by minimizing the 
standardized distance between the unfeasible ideal solution (diagonal 
elements of the pay-off matrix in Table Al) and the adjusted 
constraints set. The actual outcomes are contained in Table A 2 in 
the Appendix. 
Figure 4, which is based on those outcomes, can be used to 
evaluate the changes which occurred due to the unsatisfactory values 
of objectives identified in steps of the previous iteration. 
The compromise values for regional objectives in iterations 1 and 
2 give a rough approximation of the existing trade-offs in the 
operational version of TLM, the most noticeable being those between 
regional income and environmental quality: An improvement of 1 
percent in environmental quality of regions 1, 2, and 5, roughly leads 
to a 0.5 percent loss of regional income. Regional empioyment appears 
to be quite invariant under the choices made, because empioyment 
policy can be carried out independently from policies that alm for 
either economie growth or environmental quality (both of which have 
favorable impacts on empioyment). 
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Fig. 4. Compromise Solution of Iteration 2, between 
minimum and maximum Values for regional objectives 
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The compromise solution of the first iteration caused the choice 
of priority in region 1 to move to regional income. As a result, the 
compromise solu on of the second iteration shows that regional inc .» 
was increased by 8.5 percent. Along with this increase of income came 
a sharp decrease of the environmental quality indicator by more than 
18 percent. It is clear that those people who represent environmental 
quality for income, will be even more convinced of their choice for 
environmental quality. There may be a considerable number of people 
wanting an increase of regional income after the first iteration, but 
find their desires over-fulfilled: the increase of income is too 
sharp, while the decrease of environmental quality is too steep. This 
may result in a general tendency to support the environmental interest 
in the second iteration. 
In region 2 a reverse trade-off was chosen. The first iteration 
indicated that there was strong support for environmental quality. 
The actual outcome, an 18 percent improvement of the environmental 
quality indicator against a more than 6 percent decrease of income, 
may be very satisfactory to the core of environmentalists but, to 
many, this may be an "over-exchange". In this region the tendency may 
be to support the objective of regional income in the second iteration. 
In regions 3 and 4, the choice for regional income resulted in a 
6 percent improvement of income which is paid off by a decrease of 
environmental quality of over 10 percent. This choice situation is 
equivalent to that of region 1. In region 5 a situation has arisen 
which is comparable to that in region 2. A choice for a better 
environment results in a strong improvement of the environmental 
quality indicator by 15 percent which is accompanied by a 7 percent 
decrease in regional income. 
\ 
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4) Compromise Solution Satisfactory ? 
Assume the second compromise solution is not satisfactory. 
5) Identify Unsatisfactory Values of Objection 
The discussion of the compromise solution at step 3 allows us to 
assume the following objectives as 'most unsatisfactory' at the 
regional level: 
Iteration 2 
Region Objective to be improved 
1 environmental quality z^ 
2 environmental quality Z£ 
3 environmental quality Z3 
4 environmental quality Z4 
5 income y$ 
6) Adjust Constraints Set 
The constraints set is now adjusted in the same manner as in the 
previous iteration. New lower bounds, to be added to the constraints 
set,are: 
_L,2 
z l » 78 
4'2 = 92 
4'2 = 79 
*!r2 - V 
yj='2 = 120 
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Iteration 3 
2) Calculate Pay-off Matrix 
The pay-off matrix is derived in an analogous way to that of the 
previous iterations, taking into account the lower bounds on 
objectives which were raised in step 6 of the previous iteration. The 
pay-off matrix is included in the Appendix as Table A3. 
3) Generate Tentative Compromise Solution 
Generation of the third compromise solution is identical to that 
of the previous iteration. Actual outcomes are contained in Table A4 
(Appendix), while the diagram of Fig. 5 also represents these outcomes. 
4) Compromise Solution Satisfactory ? 
In order to demonstrate the procedure to its fuil extent we, 
again, assume that NO, the third compromise,is not satisfactory. 
5) Identify Unsatisfactory Values of Objectives 
We assume that environmental quality is to be raised in regions 
1,3,4, and 5. In region 2 an improvement of income is assumed to be 
necessary. 
6) Adjust Constraints Set 
For the objectives selected in the previous step of this 
iteration lower bounds are adjusted according to the procedure 
described in step 6 of the first iteration. 
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Fig. 5. Compromise Solution of Iteration 3, between 
minimum and maximum values for* regional objectives 
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Iteration 4 
2) Calculate Pay-off Matrix 
The fourth pay-off matrix is included in the Appendix as Table 
A 6. 
3) Generate Tentative Compromise Solution 
The fourth compromise solution contained in Table A 7 of the 
AppendiXjWas used to draw the diagram in Fig. 6. Clearly, from the 
third to the fourth iteration the adjustment of the constraints set by 
imposing new lower bounds on selected objettives has induced only 
marginal changes. 
5) Compromise Solution Satisfactory7 
Assume yes; of course, the procedure can easily be continued 
through a number of more iterations. However, we shall not do so. 
7) Tentative Compromise is Final Compromise 
Clearly, from iteration to iteration, the interactive decision-
making procedure not only gives information to the decisionmakers on 
the actual trade-offs between objectives (as inherent to the model), 
but also allows the analysts to deduce, from the choices of (groups 
of) individuals, the actual preferences. However, in order to arrive 
at an accurate assessment of these preferences, it would be necessary 
to carry out the procedure over a large number of iterations. 
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7 Concluding Remarks 
The interactive multiobjective approaches to integrated 
economic-environmental decision-making in a spatial system' 
presented and applied in the previous sections, have several 
advantages over traditional approaches: 
- They reflect the process character of complex economic-
environmental policy problems; they constitute learning aids 
for policy-makers as wel! as for modelers. 
- They emphasize an active role of policy-makers in specifying 
and solving choice problems, inter al ia by making policy 
objectives and trade-offs more explicit 
- They are able to take into account the variety and the 
conflicting nature of policy options or criteria without 
requiring a prior specification of weights. 
- They provide an integrative framework for eliminating less 
relevant alternatives and for choosing consistent compromise 
solutions. 
The simulation experiments of section 6 indicate that it is 
possible to adapt the interactive compromise procedure to varying 
institutional arrangements, even to multi-level decision-making 
procedures in which a national and regionai level are distinguished. 
\ 
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APPENDIX 
Fig. Al. 11 Provinces of the Netherlands, 
aggregated to 5 regions 
Provinces Regions 
1 Friesland 
2 Groningen 
3 Drenthe 
1 North 
U Overijssel' 
5 Gelderland 
2 Kast 
6 Utrecht 
7 Noord-Holland 
3 West I 
8 Zuid-Holland h West II 
9 Zeeland 
10 Noord Brabant 
11 Limburg 
5 South 
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MAXIMISATION OF: 
OBJ Y1 L I Z1 Y2 L2 Z2 Y3 L3 Z3 Y4 L4 Z4 Y5 L5 Z5 
Y1 127.4 118.8 105.7 121.4 117.1 124.7 119.3 119.4 124.4 12U.1 115.0 119.3 105.7 119.1 126.8 
L I 115.4 115.8 114.8 115.4 115.8 112.8 114.8 115.8 111.7 115.4 115.8 111.4 107.7 115.8 111.4 
Z1 68.8 85.6 116.0 89.8 86.6 86.0 73.0 78.5 89.1 68.8 86.8 86.3 90.0 78.9 87.8 
Y2 124.0 130.0 125.8 133.4 130.9 99 .2 121.6 129.8 120.7 123.3 132.3 126.3 104.3 128.8 124.7 
L2 115.2 115.3 114.3 115.2 115.3 112.5 114.3 115.3 111.4 115.0 115.3 110.9 107.7 115.3 110.9 
Z2 80.0 80.0 88.2 80.0 80.0 112.5 80.0 80.0 87.9 80.0 80.0 87.8 87.6 80.0 120.3 
Y3 117.4 120.1 118.6 116.0 119.9 116.9 122.1 119.9 103.1 117.3 H 9 . 9 116.1 103.1 119.9 118.3 
L3 116.2 116.4 115.4 116.1 116.4 113.4 115.4 116.4 112.8 116.2 116.4 111.8 108.0 116.4 111.5 
Z3 74.9 80.1 87.5 89.5 80.8 88.7 72.4 77.5 115.0 74.9 80.9 88.1 96.5 77.2 87.0 
Y4 123.2 121.6 122.7 119.7 121.6 122.9 119.0 121.7 119.5 126.9.121.6 106.1 106.1 121.7 125.4 
L4 U « . 7 115.0 113.9 114.7 115.0 112.3 113.$ 115.0 111.0 114.7 U 5 . 0 110.4 107.5 115.0 110.7 
Z4 70.3 79.8 83.7 84.9 80.2 83.8 73.1 77.1 83.7 69.5 80.3 112.8 97.3 77.1 83.8 
Y5 120.7 117.7 120.7 119.8 117.7 121.3 117.9 118.1 122.0 118.5 117.7 117.9 127.0 118.1 94.4 
L5 116.4 116.6 115.5 116.2 116.6 113.5 115.5 116.6 112.9 116.2 116.6 111.8 108.0 116.6 111.6 
Z5 83.1 94.9 106.9 108.1 96.2 108.0 84.2 87.7 105.8 83.1 96.5 107.1 80.9 87.7 119.7 
Table A 1. Second Iteration: 
Separate Optimization of Objectives 
Income, Employment and Environmental 
Quality at a Regional Level. 
SOLUTIONS 
MAXIMUM MINIMUM COMPROMISE 
Y1 127.4 105.7 126.9 
L I 115.8 107.7 115.6 
Z1 116.0 68.8 87.9 
Y2 133.4 99.2 123.2 
L2 115.3 107.7 115.1 
Z2 112.5 80.0 104.3 
Ï 3 122.1 103.1 121.4 
L3 116.4 103.0 116.2 
Z3 115.0 72.4 85.2 
Y4 126.9 106.1 125.9 
L4 115.0 107.5 114.7 
Z4 112.8 69.5 82.9 
Y5 127.0 94.4 113.2 
L5 116.6 108.0 116.3 
Z5 119.7 80.9 108.4 
Table A 2. Second Iteration: 
Ideal, Worst and Compromise Solutions 
for Regional Objectives. 
\ 
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HAXIHISATION OF: 
OBJ Y1 L I Z1 Y2 L2 Z2 Y3 L3 Z3 Y4 L4 Z4 Y5 L5 Z5 
t l 127.4 115.8 105.7 122.0 114.2 126.9 117.9 114.4 124.6 124.8 111.8 121.1 105.7 114.4 125.0 
L I 115.4 115.8 114.8 115.1 115.8 113.1 114.4 115.8 112.1 115.4 115.8 111.1 108.4 115.8 115.1 
Z1 78.4 98.0 116.0 89.4 98.4 86.0 82.7 97.8 85.5 78.4 98.6 87.4 91.0 97.8 86.1 
T2 123.2 125.7 124.7 131.3 125.7 99.2 116.6 127.5 117.7 120.9 126.8 121.6 106.9 127.5 121.9 
L2 115.2 115.3 114.3 114.8 115.3 112.7 113.9 115.3 111.6 115.0 115.3 110.7 108.0 115.3 114.8 
Z2 92.2 92.2 92.2 92.2 92.2 112.5 98.1 92.2 94.4 92.2 92.2 97.6 92.2 92.2 96.1 
Y3 117.4 120.0 117.7 112.2 120.5 117.7 122.1 119.2 103.1 115.4 120.0 114,4 103.1 119.2 117.6 
L3 116.2 116.3 115.3 115.8 116.3 113.6 115.2 116.4 112.8 116.2 116.3 111.7 108.3 H6.4 115.8 
Z3 82.3 84.7 86.4 90.3 84.8 88.5 78.8 85.0 115.0 82.0 84.7 88.1 92.9 65.0 87.0 
Y4 123.3 121.6 123.4 122.2 121.6 122.9 118.4 121.6 122.4 126.9 121.6 106.1 106.1 121.6 122.3 
L4 114.7 115.0 113.9 114.3 115.0 112.3 113.5 114.8 111.1 114.7 115.0 110.3 107.9 114.8 114.4 
ZU 78.4 84.2 83.7 85.7 84.3 83.8 82.6 84.3 85.8 77.2 84.3 112.8 97.6 84.3 84.5 
Y5 120.8 120.1 120.8 120.1 120.1 120.1 120.1 120.1 120.1 120.8 120.1 120.1 127.0 120.1 120.1 
L5 116.2 116.5 115.4 116.0 116.5 113.7 115.3 116.5 112.9 116.2 116.5 111.7 108.4 116.5 116.0 
Z5 93.4 101.8 105.9 
Table A 3. 
108.7 102.3 108.7 90.9 102.3 101.3 92.2 102.3 102.0 80.9 102.3 H4.2 
Third Iteration: 
Separate Optimization of Objectives 
Income, Employment and Environmental 
Quality at a Regional Leve!. 
SOLUTIONS 
MAXIMUM MINIMUM COMPROMIS E 
Y1 127.4 105.7 121.2 
L I 115.8 108.4 115.2 
Z1 116.0 78.4 102.4 
Y2 131.3 99.2 117.6 
L2 115.3 108.0 114.8 
Z2 112.5 92.2 107.1 
Y3 122.1 103-1 115.6 
L3 116.4 108.3 115.8 
Z3 115.0 78.8 96.9 
Y« 126.9 106.1 120.1 
L« 115.0 107.9 114.4 
Z4 112.8 77.2 93.5 
Y5 127.0 120.1 125.6 
L5 116.5 108.4 115.9 
Z5 114.2 80.9 92.7 
Table A 4. Third Iteration: 
Ideal, Worst and Compromise Solutions for 
Regional Objectives. 
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NAXIMISATION OF: 
OBJ Y1 L I Z1 Y2 L2 Z2 T3 L3 Z3 Y4 1.4 Z4 Y5 L5 Z5 
Y1 126.8 116.2 105.7 124.3 117.3 123.3 118.3 120.1 124.4 122.3 118.1 118.1 105.7 120.1 123.8 
L I 115.1 115.8 114.8 115.1 115.8 113.1 114.4 115.8 112.4 115.1 115.8 110.4 109.1 115.8 115.1 
Z1 90.4 97.9 116.0 90.4 95.9 90.4 90.5 90.4 90.4 90.4 94.2 9*1.1 97.2 90.4 90.4 
Y2 121.8 126.7 12». 1 131.3 127.0 108.4 117.6 128.5 120.6 120.3 126.9 122.6 108.4 128.5 122.8 
L2 114.8 115.3 11".» 11».8 115.3 112.7 11».1 115.3 112.1 114.6 115.3 110.0 108.6 115.3 11».6 
12 98.1 92.2 9».9 92.2 92.2 111.9 98.3 92.2 96.2 98.3 92.2 96.5 95.6 92.2 92.8 
Y3 117.0 118.9 118.3 11».2 118.5 11».5 121.7 117.0 103.1 114.9 118.4 110.9 103.1 117.0 117.» 
L3 115.8 116.3 115.6 115.9 116.3 113.6 115.2 116.3 H 3 . 3 115.8 116.3 U L O 108.» 116.3 115.7 
23 88.4 87.9 87.9 91.7 87.9 89.2 87.9 87.9 115.0 88.6 87.9 90.9 101.» 87.9 87.9 
L» 114.3 115.0 114.0 114.4 115.0 112.3 113.8 114.8 111.8 114.3 115.0 109.6 108.4 114.8 114.2 
Z4 85.5 85.5 85.5 86.6 85.5 87.7 90.9 85.5 85.5 85.5 85.5 112.8 106.0 85.5 85.5 
Y5 120.5 120.1 122.1 120.1 120.1 120.1 120.1 120.1 120.4 120.3 120.1 120.1 126.9 120.1 120.1 
L5 116.0 116.5 115.7 116.0 116.5 113.7 115.3 116.5 113.» 115.9 116.5 111.2 108.4 116.5 115.8 
Z5 108.0 99.7 103.0 108.5_100.4 108.1 107.2 103.5 101.2 108.0 101.1 101.8 86.8 103.5 114.2 
Table A 5. Fourth Iteration: 
Separate Optimization of Objectives 
Income, Employment and Envronmental 
Quality at a Regional Level. 
SOLUTIONS 
MAXIMUM MINIMUM COMPROMISE 
Y1 126.8 105.7 121.2 
L I 115.8 109.1 H 5 . 2 
Z l 116.0 90.4 102.7 
Y2 131.3 108.4 123.0 
L2 115.3 108.6 114.7 
Z2 111.9 92.2 106.5 
Y3 121.7 103.1 115.6 
L3 116.3 108.» 115.8 
Z3 115.0 87.9 97.0 
Y4 126.6 106.1 116.6 
L4 115.0 108.4 114.3 
Z4 112.8 85.5 9». 3 
Y5 126.9 120.1 125.6 
L5 116.5 108.4 115.9 
Z5 11».2 86.8 92.8 
Table A 6. Fourth Iteration: 
Ideal, Worst and Compromise Solutions for 
Regional Objectives. 
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S e r i e R e s e a r c h Memoranda (1 ) 
1980-1 P. Nijkamp and H. Voogd 
1980-2 H.P. Smit 
1980-3 P.v. Dijck en 
H. Verbruggen 
1980-4 P. Nijkamp and L. Hordijk 
1980-5 P. Nijkamp 
1980-6 P. Nijkamp and F.v. Dijk 
1980-7 E. Vogelvang 
New Multicriteria Methods for Physical 
Planning by Means of Multidimensional 
Scaling Teehniques 
Medium- and Long-Term Models for the 
ESCAP-Region - A Review of exisging 
models and a proposal for a new model 
system 
Productive Employment in Developing 
Countries' Exporting Industries 
Integrated Approaches to Regional Develop-
ment Models; A survey of some Western 
European Models 
Soft Econometrie Models; An Analysis of 
Regional Income Determinants 
Analysis of Conflicts in Dynamical Environ-
mental Systems via Catastrophe Theory 
A short term econometrie Model for the 
Gonsumer demand of Roasted Coffee in The 
Netherlands 
1980-8 N.van Hulst De effectiviteit van de geleide loonpolitiek 
in Nederland 
1980-9 P. Nijkamp 
1980-10 P. Nijkamp 
1980-11 P. Nijkamp 
1980-12 F.C. Palm, E. Vogelvang 
and D.A. Kodde 
1981-1 E. Vogelvang 
A survey of Dutch integrated Energy-
Environmental-Economic Policy Models 
Perspectives for Urban Analyses and Policies 
New developments in Multidimensional 
Geographical data and Policy Analysis 
Efficiënt Estimation of the Geometrie 
Distributed Lag Model; some Monte Carlo 
Results on Small Sample Properties 
A quarterly econometrie model for the Price 
Formation of Coffee on the World Market 
1981-2 H.P. Smit 
1981-3 R. Vos 
1981-4 F.C. Palm 
Demand and Supply of Natural Rubber, Part I 
The political Economy of the Republic of 
Korea; A proposal for a model framework of 
an open economy in the ESCAP-region, with 
emphasis on the Role of the State 
Structural Econometrie Modeling and Time 
Series Analysis - Towards an Integrated 
Approach 
